Context: This conceptual paper tries to tackle the advantages and the limitations that might arise from including second-order science into global climate change sciences, a research area that traditionally focuses on first-order approaches and that is currently attracting a lot of media and public attention. Problem: The high profile of climate change research seems to provoke a certain dilemma for scientists: despite the slowly increasing realization within the sciences that our knowledge is temporary, tentative, uncertain, and far from stable, the (...) public expectations towards science and scientific knowledge are still the opposite: that scientific results should prove to be objective, reliable, and authoritative. As a way to handle the uncertainty, scientists tend to produce “varieties of scenarios” instead of clear statements, as well as reports that articulate different scientific opinions about the causes and dynamics of change for this specific field of research. (shrink)

Upshot: For communicating second-order science, von Foerster’s ethical imperative provides a viable starting point. Proceeding from this, we plead in favour of emphasising the common grounds of diverging scientific opinions and of various approaches in second-order science instead of focussing on the differences. This will provide a basis for communication and stimulate scientific self-reflection.

The book deals with the notion of Downward Causation from a wide array of perspectives, including physics, biology, psychology, social science, communication studies, text theory, and philosophy. The book includes proponents as well as opponents discussing the validity of the notion.

In both the public and the business world, in academe as well as in practice, the ideas of Adam Smith are regarded as the bedrock of modern economics. When present economic conditions and management practices are criticised, Adam Smith is referred to by defenders and detractors of the current status quo alike. Smith, it is believed, defined the essential terms of reference of these debates, such as the rational pursuit of self-interest on part of the individual and the resultant optimal (...) allocation of goods in free markets thanks to the workings of an “invisible hand.” In this article, we question whether this standard view of Smith, the economist, is tenable. We provide an extensive review of the extant secondary literature from economists, business ethicists, and philosophers, comparing their assessments to crucial elements of Smith’s theoretical system. As a result, we show that Smith, far from being an advocate of a value-free or even value-averse conception of economic transactions, stood for a virtue-based and values-oriented model of business. Accordingly, we argue current management education and the pedagogy of business ethics ought to be changed, and certain strategic conclusions drawn for business practice. (shrink)

We identify a normative paradox of responsible management education. Business educators aim to promote social values and develop ethical habits and socially responsible mindsets through education, but they attempt to do so with theories that have normative underpinnings and create actual normative effects that counteract their intentions. We identify a limited conceptualization of freedom in economic theorizing as a cause of the paradox. Economic theory emphasizes individual freedom and understands this as the freedom to choose from available options. However, conceptualizing (...) individuals as profit-maximizing actors neglects their freedom to reflect on the purposes and goals of their actions. We build on the work of pragmatist philosopher John Dewey, who distinguishes between habitualized and creative problem-solving behaviors, conceptualizes knowledge construction as a process of interdependent scientific social inquiry, and understands actors as having the freedom to determine what kind of people they wish to be. We apply pragmatist theory to business education and suggest equipping students with a plurality of theories, supplementing neoclassical economics with other economic perspectives and views from other disciplines on economic behavior. Moreover, we suggest putting students into learning situations that require practical problem solution through interdependent social inquiry, encouraging ethical reflection. In doing so, we contribute by linking the problematic conceptions of freedom identified in economic theorizing to the debate on responsible management education. We conceptualize a pragmatist approach to management education that explicitly re-integrates the freedom to discursively reflect on the individual and societal purpose of business activity and thereby makes existing tools and pedagogies useful for bringing potential freedom back into business. (shrink)

Computer simulations are often claimed to be opaque and thus to lack transparency. But what exactly is the opacity of simulations? This paper aims to answer that question by proposing an explication of opacity. Such an explication is needed, I argue, because the pioneering definition of opacity by P. Humphreys and a recent elaboration by Durán and Formanek are too narrow. While it is true that simulations are opaque in that they include too many computations and thus cannot be checked (...) by hand, this doesn’t exhaust what we might want to call the opacity of simulations. I thus make a fresh start with the natural idea that the opacity of a method is its disposition to resist knowledge and understanding. I draw on recent work on understanding and elaborate the idea by a systematic investigation into what type of knowledge and what type of understanding are required if opacity is to be avoided and why the required sort of understanding, in particular, is difficult to achieve. My proposal is that a method is opaque to the degree that it’s difficult for humans to know and to understand why its outcomes arise. This proposal allows for a comparison between different methods regarding opacity. It further refers to a kind of epistemic access that is important in scientific work with simulations. (shrink)

The enhancement of social inclusion is a key to maintaining cohesion in society and to foster the benefits of cultural diversity. Using insights from the Dual Identity Model with a special focus on active categorization, we develop an intervention to increase social inclusion. Our intervention encourages the participants to categorize on a superordinate level while being exposed to their own culture. Across a set of experiments, we test the efficacy of our intervention against control conditions on the effect of social (...) inclusion, measured by perceived social distance. Results show an increase in cultural closeness and provide preliminary support for the use of a DIM-based intervention to increase intercultural inclusion. (shrink)

We provide welfarist evaluations of decision rules for federations of states and consider models, under which the interests of people from different states are stochastically dependent. We concentrate on two welfarist standards; they require that the expected utility for the federation be maximized or that the expected utilities for people from different states be equal. We discuss an analytic result that characterizes the decision rule with maximum expected utility, set up a class of models that display interstate dependencies and run (...) simulations for different dependency scenarios in the European Union. We find that, under positive correlations, the welfare distribution tends to be less sensitive to the choice of the decision rule, whereas it can be important under negative correlations. The results that Beisbart and Bovens (SCW 29, p. 581, 2007) have found for two types of models without interstate dependencies are relatively stable. There are exceptions, though, under which the way the welfare distribution is shaped by a decision rule is significantly affected by dependencies. (shrink)

Critics comment on the simplicity of the jest here, not without reason.1 But the levity also has some sophistication, of a literary kind. For a start,andare aptly long and are carefully left to the end of their clauses and lines for maximum effect. In addition, these striking words, which appear for the first time in Sappho, may well have been deliberate adaptations of two adjectives which had previously occurred only in Homer,2 and they would in any case have called to (...) mind the Homeric ones, because of their close similarity and because there are no other variants of these compounds in surviving literature down to the time of the j poetess.3 At Odyssey11.312 the poet had said of Otus and Ephialtes and at Iliad 7.220, 222, 245, 266 and 11.545 he had described the shield of Ajax asSo, given the epic flavour of Sappho′s epithets, it was amusing of her to include them at all in such a light and frivolous context. There is also pawkiness in the poetess′s application of these terms I with their Homeric tinge to quite different and very mundane objects; and the humour is increased when one takes into account the associations that these words had .This strikes me as an early instance of witty adaptation of epic diction such as is found in Anacreon 358 and 417 PMG.4. (shrink)

‘To Gödel via Babel’, MIND, July 1966.In (1), the last clause should read: ‘then the GN of the resulting P-sentence is x100.y’ In (21), the expression in Roman numerals should read: ‘$$Y.\frac{\hbox{ L }Y}{\hbox{ XIX }}$$’ In (25) and (27), the expression in Roman numerals should read: ‘$${(\hbox{ C }}^{\hbox{ XVII }}.\hbox{ D })\hbox{ . }\frac{\hbox{ L }\left({\hbox{ C }}^{\hbox{ XVII }}.\hbox{ D }\right)}{\hbox{ XIX }}$$’.

For the purposes of this paper I shall assume that some definite singular terms for individual particulars are sometimes used purely referentially or, as I shall say, with the function of direct reference; and that they sometimes occur, so used, in the belief-specifying clauses of belief-attributing sentences. Direct reference can be characterised semantically, or in terms of truth-conditions, as follows: When a direct reference is made, by some term, to a particular individual, in an utterance in which that term is (...) coupled with a predicate, then there is uttered a proposition which is true if that individual satisfies that predicate, false if it does not. A full account of the pragmatics of direct reference would be a much more complicated matter; I shall refer briefly to just one aspect of the matter towards the end of the paper. (shrink)

The introduction of conscience clauses after the 1973 US Supreme Court decision in Roe v. Wade allowed physicians and nurses to opt out of medical procedures, particularly abortions, to which they were morally opposed. In recent years pharmacists have requested the same consideration with regard to dispensing some medicines. This paper examines the pharmacists’ role and their professional and moral obligations to patients in the light of recent refusals by pharmacists to dispense oral contraceptives. A review of John Rawls’s concepts (...) of the “original position” and the “veil of ignorance”, along with consideration of the concept of compartmentalisation, are used to assess pharmacists’ requests and the moral and legal rights of patients to have their prescriptive needs met. (shrink)

This would be admirably clear and would give excellent sense, but it does entail the deletion of as an interpolation before Marshall is aware that is a word that is not likely to be used by an interpolator, but still feels able to propose its deletion and gives a detailed account of the way in which an interpolator might have approached the sentence. When one attempts to read the mind of an ancient scribe, all sorts of possibilities are opened up; (...) in this instance, it seems equally possible that a reader who, as Marshall suggests, was faced with … and was not able to understand the sentence because he failed to separate from and to see that was to be taken in the second clause, would have been inclined first at least to see whether sense could be obtained by separating from rather than to conjure up the word. (shrink)

Increasingly, physicians are being asked to provide technical services that many believe are morally wrong or inconsistent with their beliefs about the meaning and purposes of medicine. This controversy has sparked persistent debate over whether practitioners should be permitted to decline participation in a variety of legal practices, most notably physician-assisted suicide and abortion. These debates have become heavily politicized, and some of the key words and phrases are being used without a clear understanding of their meaning. In this essay, (...) I endeavor, firstly, to clarify the meaning of some of these terms: conscience, conscientious action, professional judgment, conscientious objection, conscience clauses, civil disobedience, and tolerance. I argue that use of the term conscientious objection to describe these refusals by health care professionals is mistaken and confusing. Secondly, relying on a proper understanding of the moral and technical character of medical judgment, the optimal deference that the state and markets ought to have toward professions, and general principles of Lockean tolerance for a diversity of practices and persons in a flourishing, pluralistic, democratic society, I offer a defense of tolerance with respect to the deeply held convictions of physicians and other health care professionals who hold minority views on contested but legal medical practices. (shrink)

God loves us but doesn't like us -- God is a Christian -- God wants to use me -- God is good, I am not -- God is more he than she-- God wants to be a priority in our lives -- You need to get saved -- God is in control. -- Death is more powerful than God -- God responds to magic -- God is a prude -- God does not submit -- God likes (my) religion -- God (...) doesn't care about what I care about -- Hell is separation from God -- God is not good. -- The cross was God's idea -- That was just coincidence -- God requires child sacrifice -- God is like a divine Santa Claus -- God is not involved in our suffering -- You will never find God in a box -- Not everyone is a child of God -- God is disappointed in me -- Sin separates us from God -- God is one alone -- God loves me for my potential. (shrink)

Semantic theories that violate semantic innocence, that is require reference shifts when terms are embedded in ‘that’ clauses and the like, are often challenged by producing sentences where an anaphoric expression, while not itself embedded in a context in which reference shifts, is anaphoric on an antecedent expression that is embedded in such a context. This, in conjunction with a widely accepted principle concerning unproblematic anaphora (the ‘Principle of Anaphoric Reference’), is used to show that such reference shifting has absurd (...) consequences. We show that it is the widely accepted principle concerning anaphora that is to be blamed for these consequences and not the supposed sin of reference shifting. (shrink)

In August 2005, the Competitive Enterprise Institute , a conservative advocacy organization, filed a lawsuit in Louisiana challenging the legality of the 1998 Master Settlement Agreement . The suit alleges that the MSA, under which the states receive monetary payments and the four major tobacco companies are insulated from price competition, violates the Compact Clause and other provisions of the U.S. Constitution. This lawsuit threatens to unravel of one of the most significant opportunities to improve public health in United States (...) history. We consider the merits of the lawsuit, the problems with the MSA that it highlights, and the potential consequences of the suit for public health. (shrink)

In August 2005, the Competitive Enterprise Institute, a conservative “think tank” and advocacy organization, filed a lawsuit in the Federal District Court for the Western District of Louisiana against the Louisiana Attorney General challenging the legality of the 1998 Master Settlement Agreement. If successful, this lawsuit could lead to the unraveling of one of the most significant opportunities to improve public health in United States history.Under the MSA, forty-six states agreed to end their litigation against the four largest tobacco companies (...) in the United States, who in turn agreed to pay the states an estimated $206 billion. The CEI alleges that the MSA is unconstitutional. Specifically, the suit alleges that the MSA established a cartel under which the states receive monetary payments and the four major tobacco companies are insulated from price competition – and that this arrangement violates the Compact Clause of the U.S. Constitution. (shrink)

Must the state handle the adjudication of disputes? Researchers of different perspectives, from heterodox scholars of law who advocate legal pluralism to libertarian economists who advocate the privatization of law, have increasingly questioned the idea that the state is, or should be, the only source of law. Both groups point out that government law has problems and that non-state alternatives exist. This Article discusses some problems with the public judicial system and several for-profit alternatives. Public courts lack both incentives to (...) embrace customer orientation and pricing mechanisms, plus they face problems associated with the bureaucratic provision of services. When parties are able to choose their tribunals, in contrast, those tribunals must provide service to customers and be mindful about conserving resources. Competition between arbitrators also can allow for experimentation and the provision of customized services rather than a centrally planned, one-size-fits-all system. Contracts with arbitration clauses can easily stipulate the choice of tribunal, and we argue that if government courts simply refused to overrule binding arbitration agreements, de facto privatization could easily take place. This Article discusses how the private adjudication of disputes could enable the market to internalize externalities and provide services that customers desire. (shrink)

En los últimos años, la validez de aplicar parámetros específicos de la teoría de la pragmática del lenguaje a los poemas homéricos, y a las lenguas clásicas, ha sido ampliamente comprobada. También este trabajo intenta demostrar que este tipo de abordaje permite una comprensión más profunda de los discursos persuasivos de la Ilíada. En efecto, el propósito del presente estudio es observar la utilización de los sintagmas preposicionales κατὰ μοῖραν y κατ' αἶσαν como marcadores discursivos. Así, buscamos analizar por qué (...) una reprimenda logra el éxito persuasivo al margen de la verdad enunciada acerca del código de conducta tradicional. In recent years, the validity of applying specific parameters taken from the pragmatics of language theory to the Homeric poems, and classical languages, has been widely proved. This work is another attempt to demonstrate that this kind of approach allows comprehending more deeply the persuasive discourses in the Iliad. In fact, the main purpose of this study is to observe the prepositional clauses κατὰ μοῖραν and κατ' αἶσαν working as discourse markers. In doing so, we will try to better understand the reason why a rebuke is persuasively successful beyond the truthfulness of its statements about the traditional regulatory framework. (shrink)

In the proper punctuation of this passage I have been in part anticipated by Francken, who saw that the apodosis to the conditional clause was to be sought in 235–7. But, as the second edition of the Teubner text still keeps it in its primitive incoherence, I make no apology for dealing with it here.

We present a mathematical approach to defeasible reasoning based on arguments. This approach integrates the notion of specificity introduced by Poole and the theory of warrant presented by Pollock. The main contribution of this paper is a precise, well-defined system which exhibits correct behavior when applied to the benchmark examples in the literature. It aims for usability rather than novelty. We prove that an order relation can be introduced among equivalence classes of arguments under the equi-specificity relation. We also prove (...) a theorem that ensures the termination of the process of finding the justified facts. Two more lemmas define a reduced search space for checking specificity. In order to implement the theoretical ideas, the language is restricted to Horn clauses for the evidential context. The language used to represent defeasible rules has been restricted in a similar way. The authors intend this work to unify the various existing approaches to argument-based defeasible reasoning. (shrink)

In an illuminating article, Claus Beisbart argues that the recently-popular thesis that the probabilities of statistical mechanics (SM) are Best System chances runs into a serious obstacle: there is no one axiomatization of SM that is robustly best, as judged by the theoretical virtues of simplicity, strength, and fit. Beisbart takes this 'no clear winner' result to imply that the probabilities yielded by the competing axiomatizations simply fail to count as Best System chances. In this reply, we express sympathy (...) for the 'no clear winner' thesis. However, we argue that an importantly different moral should be drawn from this. We contend that the implication for Humean chances is not that there are no SM chances, but rather that SM chances fail to be sharp. (shrink)

This paper argues that ‘that’-clauses are not singular terms (without denying that their semantical values are propositions). In its first part, three arguments are presented to support the thesis, two of which are defended against recent criticism. The two good arguments are based on the observation that substitution of ‘the proposition that p’ for ‘that p’ may result in ungrammaticality. The second part of the paper is devoted to a refutation of the main argument for the claim that ‘that’-clauses are (...) singular terms, namely that this claim is needed in order to account for the possibility of quantification into ‘that’-clause position. It is shown that not all quantification in natural languages is quantification into the position of singular terms, but that there is also so-called ‘non-nominal quantification’. A formal analysis of non-nominal quantification is given, and it is argued that quantification into ‘that’-clause position can be treated as another kind non-nominal quantification. (shrink)

Following Panaccio, 'John believes that p' is analysed as 'For some x such that x is true if and only if p, John believes x'. On this view the complement clause 'that p' acts as a restricted existential quantifier and it contributes a higher-order property.

Conditional information can be equally asserted in the forms if p, then q (e.g., ?if I am ill, I will miss work tomorrow?) and q, if p (e.g., ?I will miss work tomorrow, if I am ill?). While this type of clause order manipulation has previously been found to have no influence on the ultimate conclusions participants draw from conditional rules, we used self-paced reading to examine how it affects the real time incremental processing of everyday conditional statements. Experiment 1 (...) revealed that clause order interacts with presuppositional congruency as readers hypothetically represent counterfactual statements. When if p, then q counterfactuals contained a presupposition that was incongruent with prior context, these statements took longer to read than when the presupposition was congruent, but for q, if p conditionals there was no such congruency effect. Experiment 2 revealed that reading times were influenced by the subjective probability of an indicative conditional regardless of clause order, with a penalty observed for low-probability statements relative to high-probability statements in both conditional clause orders. These data reveal a dissociation whereby clause order mediates the effect of suppositional congruency on reading times, but does not mediate the effect of subjective probability. (shrink)

F. P. Ramsey pointed out in Theories that the observational content of a theory expressed partly in non-observational terms is retained in the sentence resulting from existentially generalizing the conjunction of all sentences of the theory with respect to all nonobservational terms. Such terms are thus avoidable in principle, but only at the cost of forming a single "monolithic" sentence. This paper suggests that communication may be thought of as occurring not only by sentence but by clause, a sentential formula (...) closed except for a special kind of variable. Understanding such clauses requires incorporating them within the scope of one's own Ramsey sentence. Many concepts of deductive and inductive logic carry over without great change. But the concepts of truth and designation are extendible to clauses only in the sense that assertions involving them must, to be understood, in turn be construed as clauses and incorporated into the Ramsey sentence. The behavior of these extended concepts of truth and designation suggests an explication of coherence truth within a correspondence-truth framework. (shrink)

The received view concerning belief ascriptions of the form ‘A believes that S’ says (A) that ‘believe’ denotes a relation holding between agents and truth-bearing entities (propositions), and (B) that ‘that’-clauses are referential expressions denoting propositions. In “‘That’-Clauses as Existential Quantifiers,” Recanati expresses his dissatisfaction with the received view. According to Recanati, (B) threatens semantic innocence. Therefore, following Panaccio, Recanati proposes to treat ‘that’-clauses of the form ‘that S’ as restricted existential quantifiers of the form ‘For some p such that (...) p is true iff S.’ In this article, I will argue that together with Kripke’s disquotational principle connecting sincere assertion and belief this analysis leads to unacceptable consequences. Since, as we shall see, the solution cannot be to reject Kripke’s disquotational principle, it will follow that the Recanati-Panaccio analysis cannot be correct. Concluding, I will show that the argument against the Recanati-Panaccio analysis of ‘that’-clauses also provides a more general way of testing semantic analyses and that, unlike the Recanati-Panaccio analysis, the received view passes this test. (shrink)

In late Medieval Greek and many modern dialects, pronominal clitics are syntactically adjoined to an IP projection. In another set of dialects they have become syntactically adjoined to a verbal head. In the most innovating dialects (which include Standard Greek) they are agreement affixes. Extending the Fontana/Halpern clitic typology, we propose a trajectory of lexicalization from Xmax clitics via X0 clitics to lexical affixes. The evolution of clitic placement also reveals the rise of a composite functional projection ΣP.

... AND PROFITABLE INVENTIONS AND DISCOVERIES; THE BEST STATE OF THAT PROVINCE”: TECHNOLOGY AND CULTURE DURING FRANCIS BACON'S STAY IN FRANCE* Luisa ...

First published in 1987. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.

First published in 1987. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.

First published in 1981. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.

Das Spannungsverhaltnis von Eigenwohl und Gemeinwohl zieht sich durch alle Poren unseres individuellen, gesellschaftlichen und politischen Lebens. Im politikwissenschaftlichen Diskurs seit der Antike wird dieses Verhaltnis als Beziehung von Legitimitat und Ziel politischer Herrschaft, Mittel und Zweck von Machterwerb und Machterhalt thematisiert. Obgleich diese Thematik auch die Gegenwart von Theorie und Praxis des Gemeinwohldiskurses nach wie vor bestimmt, kann das klassische Konzept die neuen Herausforderungen des 21. Jahrhunderts nicht mehr hinreichend erfassen. Das forschungspraktische und strategische Problemfeld der Publikation lasst sich (...) daher in der Grundfrage zusammenfassen, wie, d.h. unter welchen Voraussetzungen und mit welchen Mitteln das Spannungsverhaltnis von Eigenwohl und Gemeinwohl als theoretisch-methodisches und praktisch-politisches Problem aufgelost und fur eine Gemeinwohl-orientierte Politik im Rahmen der Herausforderungen des 21. Jahrhunderts genutzt werden kann. (shrink)

Engineering is 'the people-serving profession'. The work of engineers involves interaction with clients, other engineers, and the public at large. More than any other profession, their work also directly involves and affects the environment. This book makes the case that engineers have special professional obligations to protect and enhance the environment, and the authors - one, an engineer and the other, a philosopher - seek to provide an ethical basis for these obligations. In exploring these ethical issues, the authors aim (...) to show that engineers make a difference. The text opens with a series of case studies in which engineers face complex and challenging decisions about the environment. Succeeding chapters examine different ideas about environmental ethics for engineers, including professional codes and both modern and historical discussions of environmental responsibility. The book concludes with a collection of readings that complement the text. Students, as well as practising engineers, will find much of interest in this well-argued and thought-provoking book. (shrink)